The Statesmanship effect.
Local Leadership and Policy Priorities in Sweden..

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In studies concerning political leadership, the focus is often on leadership style and how different leaders interpret their role. In these studies, an analysis of how leadership is constructed is generally regarded as necessary if we aim to explain how the leadership is conducted and how it affects policy output. The question put forward in this paper differs from these studies. Our aim is to highlight whether a formal leadership position itself forms the politician who upholds it. Does the position shape the leader? Or more precisely: *Does the position in the municipal hierarchy* affect *the policy priorities* of a local politician?

This question is one of many that concern the importance of political institutions. It is general knowledge that the construction of political institutions could affect policy outcome. For example, to change the boarders of a municipality is to change the electorate, and that often brings about changed political majorities in the election (Johansson et al 2007). Furthermore the size of the municipality is related to the occurrence of norms such as provincialism/pluralism, and views on inclusion/exclusion among citizens and politicians (Karlsson 2007). We also know that the architecture of a multi-level government system could affect politicians with and without cumul-de-mandates to prioritise regional and local interests respectively (Bäck 2004). Sub-local organs could create the same effect within a municipality (Bäck et al 2001). A sector divided committee structure makes the members of the committees guardians of their sector rather than protectors of the general interest of the municipality (Vabo 2005, Karlsson 2003). Etc.

Since we know that belonging to institutions of different shapes influences your priorities as a politician, is it possible that your position in the political hierarchy affects your political judgement? Could there after all be some significance tied to a formal position that goes beyond each individual's interpretation of it, and the individual identity as a leader? An earlier study of leading local politicians in Sweden has described the promotion to leadership in terms of loneliness and distancing from other political colleagues, and a change in how you experience your responsibilities as a politician (Nilsson 2001). The post was there before you, and when you are appointed to it you act in accordance with the expectations since long built around the position (Erikson 2004).

Three questions will be addressed in this paper: does a leadership position pull a politician to a "middle of the road"-view of politics, does the elevation to a top post make politicians more likely to benefit the local elite, and does the position increase the responsibility for minorities in the locality?

The case of Sweden

A defining feature of the Swedish local government system is the lack of regulations concerning the authority of leading local politicians. The title mayor (*borgmästare*) was abolished in 1971, but the Swedish mayor was at that time only a judicial position, and not a part of the local government. In the eyes of the law, the democratic body of a municipality is truly a collective leadership. All major decisions are taken jointly, in council or in committees.

Yet, there are hierarchical levels in the system, where certain politicians have a higher formal rank than others. The positions that carry most of the executive power in local government are the committee leaders. And by committee leaders we mean the chairmen of both the coordinating executive committee (*kommunstyrelsen*) as well as other standing committees responsible for different service sectors (*nämnder*). But the important function of committee chairs in Swedish local democracy is not defined in the law at all. The influential role they have is a result of processes of informal institutionalization. While there are national trends concerning this aspect, for example, the relative influence of the local elite has probably been strengthened over the last decade; there are also considerable local divergences. In some municipalities the committee chairs sometimes gather in an informal power group, in others the chairs are also members of the executive committee. In yet others, neither scenario is the case. (Montin 2005, Bäck 2003)

Since the real function of the committee chairmen is legally fuzzy, it is very much up to each individual to form his/her own role. The degree of control of the committee agenda and the relation to the executive officers of the municipality and its subdivisions are important factors here. How these political leaders fulfil their leadership could therefore vary considerably between municipalities. These variations in conduct are also very fruitful as focus for research. An analysis of different leadership styles and their explanations helps us to understand how political leadership is formed in general, and the realities for leaders in Swedish local democracy in particular. But before any such study could be carried out, it is important to determine what the formal leadership position in itself means.

Figure 1: Policy priorities and leadership position

To find the answer to this question, it has been necessary to

A) find a suitable **data source** for the analysis, and to find good measurements of how local politicians make

B) **policy priorities**. In order to compare how these priorities differ between politicians with and without formal leadership positions, we have to

C) distinguish between effects of the leadership position and natural **ideological differences** between representatives of **political parties**, and control the results for several causes that could easily explain these differences, like

D) **individual factors** that distinguish the group of higher ranked politicians (such as age, gender, education etc),

E) or differences in their **self-constructed roles** (such as representation style and focus). And we have to differentiate effects which are a result of

F) important **context variables** (such as city size).

G) Since we are primarily looking for the effect of the position and not other power sources, we must also consider whether the politicians are part of the **ruling coalition** or the opposition. Then finally we can determine whether

H) a **formal leadership** position/a committee chair position, ceteris paribus, does affect a politician's political priorities.

A. Source of data – the survey

The main source of data for this paper is a survey to all council members in 49 Swedish municipalities (*kommuner*). These municipalities are all situated in the county of Västra Götaland in Western Sweden. The Västra Götaland region is in sorts a "miniature" of Sweden, where different types of municipal variations are represented much like in the country as a whole. There is a big city (Gothenburg) and there are suburbs, medium sized and small towns, and industrial and rural minor municipalities.

The survey was sent out in May 2006 and was answered by 1,357 local politicians, which gave a response rate of 64 percent. In all but two of the municipalities more than half of the councillors participated in the survey. Politicians from larger municipalities and from the liberal party are slightly overrepresented among the answering respondents.

Among the respondents, 37 percent claimed to be either chairman or vice chairman of a local committee. The majority of committee members in Swedish municipalities are not members of the council, but the people who reach a chair position are usually high ranked persons in their own party, and therefore much more likely to be a councillor. Since the survey was sent to councillors only, we will in this paper focus on the differences in policy priorities between councillors who are chairmen or vice chairmen of a committee and councillors who are not. Committee members who are not council members are not included in the analysis.

B. The dependant variables – policy priorities of local politicians

The core of politics is the task of redistributing common resources among different interest groups in society. When politicians decide who should get more and who should get less, they implicitly make use of different theories of justice. Who are the most deserving? Should we award merits or satisfy needs? How should we balance the interest of the majority with the minorities? etc. In the survey, the politicians were confronted with no less than 17 categories of municipal citizens: *alcoholics, unemployed, children, elderly, refugees, handicapped, citizens from sparsely populated areas, gays, artists, Christians, women, farmers, citizens with low wages, Muslims, mentally ill citizens, tax payers* and *entrepreneurs*, and they were asked to ponder whether these groups are so disprivileged or discriminated against, that they ought to be supported by the public sector in some way, and if so – should they be more or less supported than today? Not surprisingly, the local politicians had very different views concerning these matters.

Of the 17 groups mentioned above, the mentally ill and children were the ones which gathered the most support from the politicians. Over 80 percent of the respondents wanted these groups to get more public support than today. Least popular were the religious categories Christians and Muslims. Only 7 percent of the politicians were ready to give them extra support. Many more would like to decrease or end the public support to these groups.

When we look at the answers more closely, we see that there are patterns in the way the politicians responded. The respondents have a tendency of connecting certain groups with each other, and if a politician wants to give extra support to one group, he/she also is likely to support a couple of other groups with a comparable situation. In other words, there is a dimensionality in the data material, which could be uncovered by factor analysis. The result of such an analysis is presented below in Table 1.

Table 1: Focus of solidarity – which groups should be supported by the public?

	More support than today	Today's support is sufficient	Less support than today/no support	Dimension W ”The weak”	Dimension S ”The strong”	Dimension O ”The outsiders”
Handicapped	62	36	2	0.68		
Unemployed	63	30	7	0.67		
Mentally ill	87	13	1	0.67		
Children	80	19	1	0.66		
Citizens with low wages	68	29	3	0.65		
Alcoholics	60	37	3	0.61		
Elderly	68	31	1	0.61		
Women	51	43	6	0.49		0.38
Farmers	19	58	24		0.72	
Tax payers	17	61	21		0.70	
Entrepreneurs	63	33	5		0.69	
Christians	7	58	36		0.62	0.45
People in scarcely populated areas	33	56	11		0.59	
Muslims	7	55	39			0.79
Gays	20	57	23			0.71
Artists	15	63	21			0.62
Refugees	49	40	11	0.52		0.53
Percent of variance explained				*22*	*15*	*15*

Comments: The table is based on a survey question where the respondents were asked to answer the following: *Below follows a list of different social groups. To what extent do you feel that these groups are so disprivileged or discriminated against, that they ought to be supported by the public sector in some way?* The alternatives for each group was "Much more support than today" (2) "Somewhat more support than today" (1), "The support of today is sufficient" (0), "Somewhat less support than today" (-1), "Much less support than today" (-2) or "Should not be supported" (-3). In the table, the first column represents the percent of positive answerers, the second column "the sufficient today"-category and the third column the negative answers. In column four to six we see the result of a varimax rotated factor analysis. Factor values below 0.3 have been omitted in the table.

The strongest of these dimensions connect 8 of the 17 groups to each other. Politicians who tend to support handicapped citizens also seem to support the unemployed, the mentally ill, children, citizens with low wages, alcoholics, the elderly and women. Members of these groups are already normally the subject of support in difference ways by the public welfare system. Most of them are citizens in the need of help to uphold an acceptable standard of living (women being an exception here). Let us call this dimension "support the weak" (W).

Other categories that seem to be linked to each other in the politicians' way of reasoning, are farmers, tax payers, entrepreneurs, Christians and people in scarcely populated areas. The last of these mentioned groups are perhaps not in a favoured position, but the first four are definitively more established and included in the locality than the other groups in this survey. They are people with income and own businesses, and they belong to the majority religion. Let us therefore call this dimension "encourage the strong" (S).

The third dimension in this analysis is built around the association made by the politicians regarding the needs of four groups: Muslims, refugees, gays and artists. The first three of these are mentioned in the constitution as groups worthy of special anti-discrimination protection. The problems of artists could of course in no way be compared to racism, religious oppression and homophobia. A more plausible way of understanding the connection made between these groups is to regard the dimension as a token of "support for outsiders" (O) in the local society.

The three factor variables deduced in the table above will be the dependent variables in this paper. They are by definition non-correlated with each other, their mean is 0 and the standard deviation is 1.

By using the factor variables as dependent variables instead of, for example, additive indexes, we make sure that our analysis does not focus on the fact that the support of the groups in the W-dimension are much more widespread than for groups in the S- or O-dimensions.

Three hypotheses

In light of these three dimensions of solidarity focus, what possible effects could we expect to find due to a politicians formal hierarchical position? Could it be that local leaders score higher than other politicians on all these three dimensions? Without any empirical testing, none of the three following hypotheses sound implausible:

1. Local leaders will, independently of party membership and other factors, be more likely to appear as consensus builders and therefore hold a majority view, supporting "middle of the road" political priorities. From an institutional perspective, that cohesion-mindedness would be more likely to be applicable to committee leaders in comparison to for example directly elected mayors in other systems (Leach & Wilson 2002). To help groups included in the "support the weak-dimension" is such a non-controversial and consensus generating position. Committee leaders could therefore be expected to be more eager to "support the weak" than their colleagues with lower rank.

2. To be appointed to the highest political offices in local government could be seen as a promotion into the local elite. We know that high-ranked local politicians have frequent contacts with local business leaders. It could therefore be expected that committee leaders are more eager to "encourage the strong" than their colleagues of lower rank.

3. When promoted to committee leader, you get a wider responsibility in relation to the local community. You may feel obligated to represent not only your own voters and party, but all groups not represented in the committee, even if support to these groups is not necessarily popular among the majority of the locality. Committee leaders could therefore be expected to be more eager to "support the outsiders" than their colleagues with lower rank

The model

These hypotheses may be tested only through an elimination of effects from variables that covariate with the leadership position, this in order to ensure that any possible difference between committee leaders and other politicians are not spurious.

In the appendix of this paper three tables are presented. These tables summarize the result of several regression analyses where the factor variables mentioned above are the dependent variables and the variables mentioned in Figure 1 are introduced as independent ditto in a bivariate analysis and a five step multivariate analysis. In the following, the result from these analyses will be presented, and the importance of each category of independent variables briefly discussed.


C. Ideological position: left/right and political party

The groups comprised in the three dimensions identified above bear a striking resemblance to the categories of political target populations identified by Schneider and Ingram (1993): *the dependants*, *the advantaged* and *the deviants*. It doesn't take a political scientist to see that the dimensions are related to ongoing ideological conflicts in Swedish party politics. In fact, all three of them are significantly correlated to the politicians' subjective left/right position as measured in another question in the survey. And then we should remember that the dimensions extracted by the factor analysis by definition are uncorrelated with each other. One could say that positioning on the three dimensions are all separate components in the construction of what it means to belong to the left or to the right.

Support of the weak and the outsiders are more popular among politician to the left, and encouragement of the strong is more of a right wing position. The politicians subjective left/right position solely explain the variance in the W-dimension by 17 percent and the S- and O-dimension by 8-9 percent.

The Swedish party system is heavily based on the left/right-scale and when we add party membership to this model the variance explained is only moderately raised. In the S-dimension, "encourage the strong", party membership add a little more to the model (15 percent with party membership included in the model, 8 percent with subjective left/right position only). The explanation here is that the Centre party traditionally has especially strong ties to the agricultural sector, and support of famers and people in scarcely populated areas are some of their main political aims.

Figure2: Left/right position and solidarity focus

Comments: The graph illustrates the mean score on the factor variables extracted in the analysis above for politicians depending on their subjective left/right position. (N=1166)

D. Individual factors

In this analysis we have included four variables with regards to the politicians' social status: gender, age, level of education and ethnicity (born in or outside the country). Since we know that politicians representing different parties have somewhat different characteristics (politicians to the left are younger and there are more women and immigrants, and social democrats have lower education levels) we are faced with a tricky methodological question: Is the social status of the politicians a cause to their party affiliation, or is the fact that certain parties are more likely to recruit certain kind of politicians the cause of the connection between party membership and specific social factors? This problem is important if we want to differentiate between individual and party effects, but since we are only using these variables instrumentally, we do not have to dwell too much on this riddle. Let's just note that independently of party membership, women and politicians without university education are more eager to support the weak, older politicians with low education more often want to encourage the strong, and that none of the individual factors seem to have a separate effect on the O-dimension.

E. Representation style and focus

The respondents' construction of their role as elected representatives is measured by two variables in this analysis. We take into account if the politicians see themselves as party representatives rather than trustees or a delegate of the electorate without a personal mandate. On the whole, about 42 percent see themselves as party representatives, and this representation style is most common among social democrats.

We have also counted how many social categories or special interest groups each respondent claims to represent besides his/her party and his/her voters. In the survey, seven alternatives/groups were mentioned as possible focus of representation (the part of the municipality where you live, people of your own age, your gender, your class, an organisation, your work colleagues or your fellow countrymen). About 45 percent of the politicians answered that they do not represent any of the mentioned alternatives, but a majority of the respondents indicated that they represented at least one of them. The average number of representation objects is 2.3.

In this analysis, the representation style does not appear to have any importance. But the more groups you claim to represent, the more you seem to both encourage the strong and support the weak. Both these results could be interpreted as effects of special interest representation.

F. Contextual factors

In order to identify contextual causes of variation in the politicians' priorities, three variables were included into the model: the population of the municipality, the distance to Gothenburg (as a measure of the centre-periphery dimension), and the number of university educated citizens in the municipality (as a measure of the general social status of the locality). From an earlier study (Karlsson 2007) we know that city size is important. The tolerance for outsiders is higher in larger municipalities, and so is the willingness to take care of the weak. The "encouragement of the strong"-attitude is definitely most popular in the smallest municipalities.

But measured at the individual level, it is only among those that endorse an encouragement of the strong that any of these contextual factors seem to have significance. Since the dimension partly is built on support for farmers and people in scarcely populated areas, it is not surprising that politicians in rural municipalities far from the regional centre are more inclined to score high on this dimension.

G. Parties in power or in opposition

To be a part of the ruling side, even if you are a common politician without higher office, is also a hierarchal position of sorts, which could be compared to the formal position.

Swedish local government has been described as a quasi-parliamentary system (Bäck 1998). In virtually all municipalities one finds a coalition of ruling parties and an opposition, but all official institutions and committees are built on the principle of assembly government. The only visible indication of which parties comprise the ruling majority is the party membership of committee chairs. In most municipalities, the chairs are selected within the majority only. The chairman of the executive committee is (almost) always a representative from the ruling side. But one or two of the vice chairs are normally given to the opposition.

In this survey, 56 percent of the respondents are members of a ruling majority, and 44 of the opposition in their municipality. Among committee chairs and vice chairs, the numbers are 63 percent in majority and 37 in opposition. Since this survey was made before the general election of 2006, socialists, social democrats and greens were more likely to be part of a municipal majority than a member of parties to the right, but the differences in likelihood are minor.

When we control for party membership, this variable has no effect on the W- or S-dimensions, but it has a significantly positive effect on the O-dimension. Irrespectively of party membership and formal hierarchal position, a member of the majority is more likely to support the outsiders than a member of the opposition.

H. The formal position – being a committee leader.
At this point we are ready to conclude which effects the formal post of a committee chair has on the leader who upholds it. Let us repeat our three hypotheses:

1. *Committee leaders are more eager to "support the weak" than their colleagues with lower rank.* If only looking at the bivariate effect of position on the W-dimension, one could be mislead to think that the relation is the reversed than the one postulated in the hypothesis. Committee chairmen are slightly but significantly less inclined than others to support the weak. But in the end, when controlled for other variables – in particular left/right-position/party membership, gender and education – the effect disappears. The chair in itself does not affect sympathy for the weak, it seems.

2. *Committee leaders are more eager to "encourage the strong" than their colleagues of lower rank.* Here the result truly is the reversed compared to the hypothesis. Committee leaders are less keen on encouraging the strong than their colleagues in the council, and this conclusion remains after controlling for all the factors in the model. The negative effect is small but significant. Political leaders do not want to favour the local elite.

3. *Committee leaders are more eager to "support the outsiders" than their colleagues with lower rank.* This hypothesis is confirmed in the analysis. The strong bivariate effect is confirmed and reinforced in the multiple analysis. Committee leaders do want to support the outsiders more than other politicians.

Conclusion
In conclusion, committee leaders are less likely to support the local elite and more likely to support outsider groups in the society than other councillors. In addition, being placed by the voters on the ruling side rather than in opposition also seems to cause the same affect. We have found no indication of a leadership effect on the level of sympathy for the large groups normally included in local welfare system.

What interpretation could we make of these findings? Our suggestion is that we see the pattern of a *statesmanship effect*. A statesman is one who exercises political leadership wisely and without narrow partisanship. Klausen (2006) argues that the term statesman should be applicable to leaders on the local level as well, and not just be reserved to the national level as the prefix "state" alludes.

When promoted to a higher office, your political perspective changes. You discover that a new kind of responsibility is placed upon you. You are no longer only a foot soldier for your party or a self acclaimed representative of one or several special interests of your choice. You are the leader of all and therefore responsible for the wellbeing of all groups in the locality. And since you are the public face of your committee, you are the one most likely to be hold accountable should anyone be mistreated.

If we allow ourselves to be normative, this is a genuinely positive as it is a surprising result. Especially if one is indoctrinated into the hegemonic "power corrupts"-discourse. "Leadership refines" is the new thesis, which of course will have to be studies much more to be confirmed more solidly.

Self criticism and elaboration
Even though the statesmanship effect is statistically confirmed, we should not overestimate its size, and there is still much to investigate before we are fully able to explain our findings. A major disclaimer to the conclusion above is that we have no formal ground for making a certain claim on the causal relation between position and priorities. It is of course possible that the kind of politicians that are appointed to be committee chairs, or politicians on the winning side of an election, are more sympathetic to outsiders before they are promoted or win the election. But given what we know how political appointments and, in particular, how elections are carried out, this doesn't sound very likely. But only further research could prove this point.

Another criticism that could be directed towards our analysis is that the local leaders in question are more likely than others to be held publicly responsible for the policy outcomes, and therefore base their

priorities on strategy rather than values. Maybe the statesmanship effect is more of political cleverness than humanistic refinement? What speaks against this counter-argument is the way we have measured the priorities. These are results of an anonymous survey where all politicians could answer what they really feel without worries of being exposed to the public.

We are also able to relate the result to the media exposure of each respondent. The result of that analysis is that among politicians with normal relations with the media, that is those who meet journalists 1-3 times a month or more seldom, the statesmanship effect is obvious. But among the few committee chairmen who meet the press more often than that, the sympathy for the outsiders shrinks almost to the level that the even fewer common councillors with that kind of media exposure present. Among councillors without chairs, the degree of media exposure does not affect their priorities on the O-dimension at all.

Another type of criticism could be that the statesmanship effect is not due to the chair but to the possession of power. In the survey we measure the individual respondent's self-appraisal of his/her own influence in the municipality as one of many categories of local actors.

Of course there is a strong correlation between a politician's formal hierarchy position and the subjective estimation of power, and the same goes for the ruling majority/opposition-variable. But there are many chairs who claim to have little influence, and quite a few common councillors that deem themselves to be quite influential – on both the majority and the opposition sides.

Figure 3: Support for the outsiders (O-dimension) due to formal position, majority/opposition status and to self-appraised "power"

Comments: The y-scale in the graph represent mean values on the factor variable built on the O-dimension (see Table 1 above). The question of the respondents influence was formulated: *Could you, based on your experience as a local politician, indicate how much real influence the following actors have over municipal activities.* And among 15 local actors the alternative "you yourself" was mentioned. The answers were given on a scale from 0 "No influence" to 4 "Big influence" and "big influence" in the graph indicates an answer 3 or 4 on that scale. N = 1155.

As we can see in Figure 3, there seem to be a positive correlation between how much influence a politician deems he/she has and his/her values on the O-dimension. Unfortunately the multicollinearity problem prevents us from including the "own influence"-variable in the regression model. But, as we see in the figure, there is clearly an independent "chair effect" – and a majority effect. Chairmen with little influence are more positive to outsiders than common councillors with much influence. And members of the opposition with influence are more sympathetic to outsiders than opposition members without influence.

All together, the variables 1. having a formal position of a chair, 2. of being part of a parliamentary majority 3. being influential due to other more informal grounds, all point in the same direction: Power refines.

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Appendix: Regression models

Table 2: Dependent Variable: Support the weak (W) factor dimension

	Bivariate B		R²	M1 B	M2 B	M3 B	M4 B	M5 B	ß
(Constant)				0.43 *	0.24	0.13	0.21	0.22	
C) Left/right position	**-0.17**	***	0.17	**-0.09** ***	**-0.09** ***	**-0.09** ***	**-0.09** ***	**-0.09** ***	-0.22
Socialist	**1.08**	***	0.06	**0.65** ***	**0.66** ***	**0.67** ***	**0.66** ***	**0.65** ***	0.16
Social democrat	**0.56**	***	0.07	0.17	0.08	0.12	0.12	0.13	0.06
Green	0.09		0.000	-0.04	-0.06	-0.05	-0.07	-0.08	-0.02
Center party	**-0.40**	***	0.02	-0.27	**-0.30** *	-0.28	-0.26	-0.24	-0.09
Liberal	**-0.34**	***	0.01	-0.20	-0.16	-0.13	-0.13	-0.12	-0.04
Chist democrat	-0.05		0.000	0.12	0.13	0.14	0.14	0.15	0.04
Conservative	**-0.75**	***	0.07	**-0.35** *	**-0.32** *	**-0.30**	**-0.30** *	**-0.30**	-0.11
D) Gender: Female	**0.44**	***	0.04		**0.45** ***	**0.39** ***	**0.38** ***	**0.38** ***	0.18
Age	0.00		0.000		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01
Ethnicity: Born abroad	0.27		0.000		0.20	0.15	0.14	0.14	0.03
Higher education	**-0.26**	***	0.02		**-0.26** ***	**-0.22** ***	**-0.23** ***	**-0.23** ***	-0.11
E) Representation style: Party rep.	**0.13**	*	0.004			-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
Number of representation focus	**0.07**	***	0.03			**0.04** ***	**0.04** ***	**0.04** ***	0.11
F) Population 2005 (log)	**0.07**	*	0.004				-0.04	-0.04	-0.03
Distance to Gothenburg	0.00		0.000				0.00	0.00	0.03
Citizen education level 2005	**0.01**	*	0.01				0.01	0.01	0.09
G) Member of the majority	**-0.19**	***	0.01					-0.05	-0.02
H) Chairman (or vice chairmen) of committee	**-0.12**	*	0.004					-0.04	-0.02
R2				**0.208**	**0.263**	**0.268**	**0.27**	**0.27**	

Table 3: Dependent Variable: Encourage the strong (S) factor dimension

	Bivariate B		R²	M1 B	M2 B	M3 B	M4 B	M5 B	ß
(Constant)				0.07	-0.42	-0.56	0.01	-0.09	
C) Left/right position	**0.12**	***	0.08	0.04	**0.05** *	**0.05** *	**0.05** *	**0.05** *	0.12
Socialist	**-0.66**	***	0.03	**-0.75** ***	**-0.60** **	**-0.60** **	**-0.49** **	**-0.48** *	-0.12
Social democrat	**-0.48**	***	0.05	**-0.50** **	**-0.53** ***	**-0.43** **	**-0.37** *	**-0.33** *	-0.16
Green	**-0.36**	*	0.01	**-0.60** **	**-0.49** *	**-0.49** *	**-0.38** *	**-0.38** *	-0.07
Center party	**0.67**	***	0.06	0.28	0.28	**0.32** *	**0.34** *	**0.36** *	0.13
Liberal	**-0.44**		0.00	-0.35 *	-0.26	-0.18	-0.11 *	-0.09	-0.03
Chist democrat	**0.56**	***	0.02	0.18	0.25	0.26	**0.33** *	**0.34** *	0.10
Conservative	**0.24**	**	0.01	-0.19	-0.16	-0.11	-0.03	0.00	0.00
D) Gender: Female	0.01		0.00		**0.15** **	0.06	0.08	0.07	0.04
Age	**0.01**	***	0.02		**0.01** ***	**0.01** **	**0.01** **	**0.01** ***	0.09
Ethnicity: Born abroad	-0.23		0.00		-0.02	-0.13	-0.07	-0.08	-0.02
Higher education	**-0.27**	***	0.02		**-0.34** ***	**-0.28** ***	**-0.27** ***	**-0.27** ***	-0.14
E) Representation style: Party rep.	**-0.30**	***	0.02			**-0.14** **	-0.11	-0.10	-0.05
Number of representation focus	**0.07**	***	0.03			**0.07** ***	**0.07** ***	**0.06** ***	0.16
F) Population 2005 (log)	**-0.21**	***	0.04				-0.08	-0.08	-0.07
Distance to Gothenburg	**0.00**	***	0.03				**0.00** *	**0.00** **	0.09
Citizen education level 2005	**-0.03**	***	0.03				0.00	0.00	0.01
G) Member of the majority	**0.14**	*	0.004					0.04	0.02
H) Chairman (or vice chairmen) of committee	**-0.15**	*	0.01					**-0.12** *	-0.06
R2				**0.15**	**0.19**	**0.214**	**0.24**	**0.25**	

Significance levels: *** = .001 ** = .01 * = .05

Table 4: Dependent Variable: Support the outsiders (O) factor dimension

	Bivariate B		R²	M1 B		M2 B		M3 B		M4 B		M5 B		ß
(Constant)				0.13		0.19		0.26		0.07		0.09		
C) Left/right position	**-0.12**	***	0.09	**-0.10**	***	**-0.10**	***	**-0.10**	***	**-0.10**	***	**-0.10**	***	-0.25
Socialist	**0.34**	**	0.01	0.35		0.26		0.23		0.25		0.28		0.07
Social democrat	**0.38**	***	0.03	**0.38**	*	**0.35**	*	**0.33**	*	**0.35**	*	0.30		0.14
Green	0.15		0	**0.40**	*	0.33		0.32		0.35		0.40		0.08
Center party	-0.05		0	**0.38**	*	**0.33**	*	**0.31**		0.31		0.24		0.08
Liberal	-0.03		0	**0.41**	*	**0.34**	*	**0.36**	*	**0.37**	*	**0.35**	*	0.12
Chist democrat	0.03		0	**0.54**	**	**0.47**	**	**0.46**	**	**0.48**	**	**0.45**	**	0.13
Conservative	**-0.68**	***	0.06	0.06		0.04		0.06		0.08		0.03		0.01
D) Gender: Female	**0.13**	*	0.004			0.07		0.07		0.07		0.10		0.05
Age	0.00		0			0.00		0.00		0.00		0.00		-0.02
Ethnicity: Born abroad	-0.12		0			-0.16		-0.13		-0.11		-0.08		-0.02
Higher education	0.03		0			0.11		0.10		0.11		0.12		0.06
E) Representation style: Party rep.	0.10		0					0.01		0.02		0.01		0.00
Number of representation focus	0.01		0					0.00		0.00		0.00		0.00
F) Population 2005 (log)	0.00		0							0.04		0.02		0.02
Distance to Gothenburg	0.00		0							0.00		0.00		0.01
Citizen education level 2005	-0.01		0							-0.01		-0.01		-0.06
G) Member of the majority	0.11		0									**0.14**	**	0.07
H) Chairman (or vice chairmen) of committee	**0.19**	***	0.01									**0.20**	***	0.10
R2				**0.10**		**0.11**		**0.11**		**0.11**		**0.12**		

Table 5: Independent variables

C) Left/right position	Subjective position - Measured on a scale from 0-10, where 10 is most to the right and 0 most to the left. Mean 4.73
Socialist	Member of Vänsterpartiet. 7 percent of the respondents.
Social democrat	Member of Socialdemokraterna. 35 percent of the respondents
Green	Member of Miljöpartiet. 4 percent of the respondents
Center party	Member of Centerpartiet. 14 percent of the respondents.
Liberal	Member of Folkpartiet liberalerna. 11 percent of the respondents.
Chist democrat	Member of Kristdemokraterna. 8 percent of the respondents.
Conservative	Member of Moderaterna. 16 percent of the respondents.

(Membership these parties are measured through dummy variables. Members of other parties – 4 percent of the respondents - were omitted in the analysis)

D) Gender: Female	Female gender =1, male=0. 38 percent of the respondents are women, 62 men.
Age	Number of years. Mean: 57 years.
Ethnicity: Born abroad	4 percent of the respondents were born abroad.
Higher education	50 percent of the respondents have some kind of university education.
E) Representation style: Party rep.	In a conflict of opinions in the council, 42 percent claims to follow the party line ("party represent-ative"), 47 percent follow their own opinion and 11 percent follow the opinion of the voters.
Number of representation focus	How many of 7 mentioned alternatives/groups (the part of the municipality where you live, people of your own age, your gender, your class, an organisation, your work colleagues or your fellow countrymen) which the respondents claim to especially represent – beside their own party and voters. 45 percent don't represent any of these. Mean: 2.33.
F) Population 2005 (log)	The population among the 49 municipalities in Västra Götaland varies between 4,900 and 485,000, with a mean of 42,000. In this model, the variable is logarithmed so that 4,900 citizens represent 8.51 and 485,000 is 13.08, with a mean of 9.96.
Distance to Gothenburg	Measured in kilometres, the distance from the municipality farthest from Gothenburg is 211. And the value for Gothenburg is obviously 0. Mean: 95.
Citizen education level 2005	The percentage of citizens over 18 with university education varies in the 49 municipalities between 13.5 and 38.7 percent. Mean is 22.4.
G) Member of the majority	56 percent of the respondents are member of parties that compose a ruling majority in their municipality. 44 are members of the opposition.
H) Chairman (or vice chairmen) of committee	37 percent of the respondents claim to be chairmen or vice chairmen in a committee. (there are usually 2 vice chairmen in a committee, where the opposition holds at least one of the posts).

Please not that effects of different independent variables could not be easily compared, since some of them are not dichotomous. The ß-value in the last column of the three tables are standardized coefficients and should not be interpreted as real effects but rather as measures of the importance of each variable in the explanatory power of the M5-model.